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JURISDICTION OF THE STATES TO TAX
-RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
FOWLER VINCENT HARPER*
The recent case of Farmers Loan and Trust Company v. Min-
nesota' again raises the interesting and all-important question
of how far a state may go under the Fourteenth Amendment in
taxing property to which it has in one way or other some con-
nection. The Supreme Court here held that the State of Minne-
sota could not impose an inheritance tax upon the testamentary
transfer of bonds and obligations of Minnesota municipal cor-
porations kept by the owner in New York, where he had been
domiciled and where his will was probated, none of such bonds
and obligations having any connection with any business con-
ducted by or on behalf of decedent in Minnesota.
The decision, it is seen, overturns a number of cases in the
State courts holding that an inheritance tax on intangibles
might be collected at the domicile of the debtor,2 although there
were decisions in several states to the contrary.3  Justices
Holmes and Brandeis dissent on the theory that the domicile
of the debtor furnishes the law that make the obligations con-
tinuing and that it is this domiciliary law in the last analysis
that compels payment. "The right to tax exists in this case
because the party needs the help of Minnesota to acquire a right
and that state can demand a quid pro quo in return."4 This is
consistent with the position taken by the Supreme Court in
analogous cases in the past 5 as to the rational basis for jurisdic-
* See p. 517 for biographical note.
1 50 Sp. Ct. Rep. 98 (Jan. 6, 1930).
2 Re Adams Estate, 167 Iowa 382, 149 N. W. 531; Graves v. Shaw,
173 Mass. 205, 53 N. E. 372; Borden v. Burrall, 221 Mass. 212, 109 N. E.
153; State v. Probate Court, 128 Minn. 371, 150 N. W. 1094; Re Rogers'
Estate, 149 Mich. 305, 112 N. W. 931; Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189,
47 L. Ed. 439.
3 Chambers v. Mumford, 187 Col. 228, 201 Pac. 588; People v. Blair,
276 Ill. 623, 115 N. E. 218; Gilbertson v. Oliver, 129 Iowa 568, 105 N. W.
1002.
4 50 Sp. Ct. Rep. 98, 101-102.
5 "The power of taxation, indispensable to the existence of every civil-
ized government, is exercised upon the assumption of an equivalent rend-
ered to the taxpayer in the protection of his person and property, in
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tion to tax, and sounds very much like the language used by
Justice Holmes in Blackstone v. Miller. 6
Two objections have been made to the argument. In the first
place the law of any other state where jurisdiction might be
obtained over the debtor would likewise compel him to pay.
Again, the law of the domicile could not do otherwise than
compel the debtor to pay.7 That domicile could not impair the
obligation of contracts nor could it take the creditor's property
without due process of law. Thus even back of the domiciliary
law is the Federal Constitution which prohibits the State of
.Minnesota from "abolishing the debt by its fiat."
It is submitted that the objections are not tenable and so
far as the Holmes dissent enunciates a conflict of laws theory,
it is clearly sound. It is no answer, as the opinion points out,
that the creditor might recover in any state wherein he obtains
personal service of the defendant, for such recovery would be
not at all by virtue of the contract law of the forum but solely
by virtue of its conflict of laws rule which looks to Minnesota
law to determine the creditors substantive rights. Again,
although the Constitution guarantees the creditor the inviola-
bility of his contract rights, it does so by making Minnesota
impotent to change its law. Any attempt to do so is null and
void so that as the venerable Justice points out, it is the Min-
nesota law (albeit under compulsion) that makes the contracts
binding.8
The answer to Holmes' argument, in this case, is to be found
in the opinion of Justice Stone. The secret lies in a simple
analysis of the character of the tax in question.
Mr. Justice Stone agrees with the result reached by the ma-
jority but writes a concurring opinion. He rests his decision
adding to the value of such property or in the creation and maintenance
of public conveniences in which he shares, such, for instance as roads,
bridges, sidewalks, pavements, and schools for the education of his children.
If the taxing power be in no position to render those services, or other-
wise to benefit the person or property taxed . . . the taxation of such
property . . . partakes rather of the nature of an extortion than
a tax . . ." Union Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194, 202.
G 188 U. S. 189, 47 L. Ed. 439: "What gives a debt validity? Nothing
but the fact that the law of the place where the debtor is will make him
pay. It does not matter that the law would not need to be invoked in the
particular place."
See Goodrich, Conflict of Laws (1926) p. S5.
s See Carpenter on taxing debts at the domicile of the debtor, 31 Harv.
L. Rev. 924 ff.
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upon what, it is submitted, is the sound ground from a logical
viewpoint, namely that what is here taxed is nothing more than
the testamentary transfer of the bonds and that transfer must
be by virtue of the law of New York. The tax is an excise or
privilege tax, and no state can impose such a tax except the
state where the act is performed or where the privilege is
enjoyed.0  "It is enough to uphold the present decision that
the transfer was effective in New York by one domiciled there
and is controlled by its law."9
The majority not only held that the tax in question could not
be imposed at the debtor's domicile, expressly overruling Black-
stone v. Miller,' but they purported to indicate that the tend-
ency of the Supreme Court to curb the greed of the states on
matters of taxation is and will continue to be a definite policy
of the Court. Some portions of the opinion are obviously
designed to hint that other situations which result in "double
taxation" may come under the cloud of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. It has been thought that double taxation alone was not
inconsistent with due process of law and many decisions and
dicta testify to the validity of multiple taxation upon the same
' See Pr-ovident Savings Association v. Kentucky, 239 U. S. 103, 60
L. Ed. 167, L. R. A. 1916 C, 572. See Carpenter, supra, note 8, at p. 922.
91, Does this argument prove too much? Suppose the decedent had
beeen domiciled in Connecticut, his bonds being permanently located in
New York. Connecticut could impose an inheritance tax. Silberinan v.
Blodgett, 277 U. S. 1. But this is because both Connecticut law and New
York law is necessary to effect the transfer. See Goodrich, Conflict of
Lawu'r, p. 377-378. In no event does Minnesota law contribute to making
effective the transfer.
I0 "Blackstone v. Miller no longer can be regarded as a correct exposi-
tion of existing law and to prevent misunderstanding it is definitely over-
ruled." In Blackstone v. Miller, it had been held that New York might
lawfully impose an inheritance tax upon simple choses in action of a
non-resident decedent because the debtor was domiciled in New York and
the debt had existed for some months.
It is to be noted that Dean Carpenter in his article, supra, note 8, at
p. 930 predicted the repudiation of State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds, 15
Wall. 300, 21 L. Ed. 179, in which the Supreme Court held invalid a
Pennsylvania statute taxing foreign held bonds of Pennsylvania corpora-
tions. Blackstone v. Miller, supra, pointed in that direction. The conflict
oi Laws theory of Mr. Justice Holmes seemed to demand it. Instead, the
Court now expressly overrules Blackstone v. Miller, and, as Mr. Justice
Holmes apparently thinks, repudiates his doctrine of conflict of laws. It
is urged, however, that this latter result is a non-sequuntur, for reasons
assigned in the text.
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property.1 There are growing limitations, however, upon this
practice by the states where it is thought the results are unfair.
To appraise the significance of the current case it is necessary
to note briefly the extent of the checks imposed to date upon
double taxation.
The starting point of course in all cases raising the question
of state power to tax under the Fourteenth Amendment is the
proposition that no state may tax property that is not within its
jurisdiction.' 2 The problem is to determine and measure the
jurisdiction of the state over property for purposes of taxation.
It is to be observed that there is no objection to "double taxa-
tion" if the state has jurisdiction. If the two or more taxes
are imposed by the state with conceded jurisdiction there can
be no objection under the Federal Constitution providing, of
course, the tax measures are uniform, for public purposes and
are not discriminatory. There is no more objection to a state
with jurisdiction taxing the same property twice than there is
to doubling the tax upon the same property. The questions
arise under the due process clause where two or more states
attempt to tax the same property and thus the problem is one
of jurisdiction.
As to property taxes, jurisdiction to tax land is, of course,
perfectly well settled. No state but the state of the situs of
the land can tax it, 1' nor can a state measure a personal tax
on its citizen by the value of his foreign realty.14 It is not due
process of law. In respect to a tax on personalty a distinction
is taken between tangibles and intangibles. It is settled law now
that tangibles may be taxed in the state where they are
permanently located15 and if they are so permanently located
in a foreign state they are not taxable at the domicile of the
1i See Cream of Wheat v. County of Grand Forks, 253 U. S. 325, 64
L. Ed. 931; Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Louisville, 245 U. S. 54,
62 L. Ed. 145; Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U. S. 1, 72 L. Ed. 749; Bristol
v. Washington Co., 177 U. S. 133, 44 L. Ed. 701. See opinion of Mr.
Justice Stone in Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 50 Sp. Ct. Rep.
98, 101; "Hitherto the fact that taxatioh is 'double' has not been deemed
to affeet its constitutionality . .
12 State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300, 21 L. Ed. 179; Union
Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194, 50 L. Ed. 150. See
also Goodrich, Conflict of Laws (1926), p. 65.
13 See Goodrich, op. cit., pp. 72-74 and cases cited.
14 Louisville & J. Ferry Co. v. Kentucky, 188 U. S. 385, 47 L. Ed. 513.
15 Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517, 29 L. Ed. 715.
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owner. 6 But if they are transient and only temporarily within
the foreign state they are not taxable there,17 except where
there is always a number of such or similar chattels within the
state in which case they may be taxed upon the "average"
basis,' 8 or where there is a temporary stoppage for the per-
formance of some act with respect to the property for the
benefit of the owner.' 9 Tangible property that is transient and
has not acquired such a situs for taxation is still taxable at the
domicile of the owner on the theory of mobilia sequunter
persollam. 20
With respect to an inheritance tax upon tangibles the same
limitation has been extended. Although formerly an inheritance
tax could be constitutionally imposed at the domicile upon the
transfer of all tangible property wherever located,2 1 it is now
settled that the domiciliary tax cannot include tangibles that
are permanently located in another state.22 It is not due process
of law.
Thus while the maxim mobilia sequunter has here lost much
of its force until taxation by more than one state on the same
tangibles is eliminated, the dogma has not been emasculated to
an equal extent with respect to intangibles. Accordingly there
is much "double taxation" of this type of property since it is
recognized that intangibles may acquire a situs for tax purposes
other than the domicile of the owner so that certain kinds of
intangibles such as bonds,23 negotiable notes 24 and bank de-
posits 2, may be taxed where they are permanently kept or
10 Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194, 50 L.
Ed. 150.
17 Kelly v. Rhoades, 188 U. S. 1, 47 L. Ed. 359. See Powell, Taxation
of Things in Transit, 7 Va. L. Rev. 167, 245, 429, 497.
'$Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18, 35 L. Ed.
613.
lo Bacon v. Illinois, 277 U. S. 504, 57 L. Ed. 615; McCutchen V. Board
of Equalization, 87 N. J. Law 370, 94 Atl. 310. These cases, however,
arise under the Commerce Clause and not under the Fourteenth
Amendment
,20 Southern Pacific Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U. S. 63, 56 L. Ed. 96.
21 See Goodrich, Conflict of Law, p. 106.
22 Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473.
23 Scottish Union etc. v. Bowland, 196 U. S. 611, 49 L. Ed. 619; Buck
v. Miller, 147 Ind. 586, 45 N. E. 647.
24 New Orleans v. Stemple, 175 U. S. 309, 44 L. Ed. 174.
25 Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Louisville, 245 U. S. 54, 62 L. Ed.
145; Schmidt v. Fatley, 148 Ind. 150, 47 N. E. 326.
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where they have acquired a business situs.26 It has been held
that jurisdiction to tax choses in action exists at the domicile of
the debtor27 and at the domicile of the creditor2 8 on the theory
that either domicile has jurisdiction for tax purposes. The
former view is probably not good law now, 29 and is certainly
not so far as the inheritance tax on bonds is concerned, as the
principal case decides.
Not two years ago, the Court by a unanimous decision, upheld
an inheritance tax by the State of Connecticut imposed upon
bonds held by a citizen domiciled in that state, although such
bonds had never been in the state, were kept in New York, used
for business purposes there and were subject to taxation there.30
It was, of course, urged upon the Court that here was a splendid
opportunity to abolish the distinction between tangible and
intangible wealth, and to extend the rule of the Frick case to
prevent taxation at the domicile of the owner upon property
which had acquired a taxable situs and was subject to the death
duties of another state. This the Court refused to do and the
power of Connecticut was upheld upon the strength of the doc-
trine of mobilit sequuntur personam, which, the Court thought
was too deeply imbedded in the law to be disturbed.
Thus it is seen that the theory of mobilia sequuntur together
with the inconsistent doctrine that intangibles may acquire a
taxable situs elsewhere has led to the possibility, and in many
cases the actual taxation of the same property or the same suc-
cession by two or more jurisdictions. Last fall, the Court in
a case3 ' which raised the simple question whether the domicile
of the beneficiary of a trust could impose a tax on the intangible
wealth held in trust, such wealth being actually located in and
the trustee being domiciled in another state, took occasion to
drag into its opinion the wholly irrelevant doctrine of mobilia
sequuntur personam and to disclose the injustice and evils of
26 Bristol v. Washington, 177 U. S. 133, 44 L. Ed. 701; Buck v. Miller,
147 Ind. 586, 45 N. E. 647.
27 Wilcox v. Ellis, 14 Kan. 588 and see language of Mr. Justice Holmes
in Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189, 47 L. Ed. 439, which, however, was
an inheritance tax case. See note 2, supra.
2SKirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U. S. 491; 25 L. Ed. 558.
29 See State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300; 21 L. Ed. 179;
see also Foresnian v. Byrns, 68 Ind. 247.
3 0 Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U. S. 1.
31 Safe Deeposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore v. Virginia, 50 Sp. Ct. 59.
JURISDICTION OF STATE TO TAX
the practice of the states.22 The entire matter was a dictum and
probably meaningless. Again in the present case, the majority
speaking again through Mr. Justice McReynolds engage in much
talk about the alteration and change of conditions and unfair-
ness and injustice of double taxation not so much by reason of
the doctrine of mobilia sequuntur persovam which the Court
appeared this time to approve, but upon the practice of foreign
states taxing the same property which it seemed conceded the
domicile had jurisdiction to tax. 33 Again the discussion is un-
called for and the baldist of dicta. The case is a simple one
and the question narrow. Mobilia sequuntur personam was
not involved and had no application. Nor did the practice of
taxing intangibles where their documentary evidence is
permanently located. The Court had no occasion to examine the
policy which the states have followed, with the assent of the
Supreme Court, for three quarters of a century. It is sub-
mitted, that in view of the position maintained by an undivided
Court of less than two years ago, 3 4 intangibles may still be taxed
at the domicile of the owner and that domicile may continue
to impose death duties, regardless of the fact that such property
may have acquired a taxable situs and is in fact taxed else-
where.
It is further submitted that it is the sheerest of folly to expect
a change in the law that the Court has carefully developed for
years allowing the states to tax the succession of intangibles
when the documentary evidence is permanently located therein.
Although it is now settled, of course, that the domicile of
the debtor may not tax the succession of bonds where such is
.3" See Note, 78 Penn. L. Rev. 532-538 (1930).
33"While debts have no actual territorial situs, we have ruled that
a state may properly apply the rule mobilia sequuntur personam and treat
them as localized at the creditor's domicile for taxation purposes. Tangibles
with permanent situs therein, and their testamentary transfer, may be
taxed only by the state where they are found. And we think the general
reasons declared sufficient to inhibit taxation of them by two states apply
under present circumstances with no less force to intangibles with taxable
situs imposed by due applications of the legal fiction. . . . And cer-
tainly existing conditions no less imperatively demand protection of choses
in action against multiplied taxation whether following misapplication
of some legal fiction or conflicting theories concerning the sovereign's right
to exact contributions. For many years the trend of decisions here has
been in that direction." (Italics mine.)
34 Blodget v. Silberman, 277 U. S. 1.
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the only claim to jurisdiction to tax, there is still much "double
taxation." It is still possible for states to tax owners of
intangibles at their domicile, though such intangibles are taxed
elsewhere on the theory that they have a "situs" there.35 It is
still possible to tax the testamentary disposition of intangibles
at the domicile of the testator,36 although such intangibles are
taxable elsewhere.37 To make an estate subject to the jurisdic-
tion of but one state to impose death duties, it would be neces-
sary either to overrule the Silberman case, and prohibit the
domicile from taxing when a tax was permissible elsewhere,
or prohibit such taxing at any state where the documentary
evidence of such intangible might be permanently located or
have a business situs. The Supreme Court in the majority
opinion cited the Silberman case with approval and mentioned,
with apparent approval, some of the long and impressive line
of decisions approving direct property taxes and inheritance
taxes where the documents are permanently located or have been
"localized." It can hardly be supposed that this decision is
intended, without mentioning them, to overrule directly Wheeler
v. Sohmer, 38 and the large number of state decisions allowing
such a succession tax,39 and to overrule indirectly Scottish
Union and National Insurance Co. v. Bowland,40 New Orleans
v. Stemple,41 Parish of New Orleans v. Comptoir Natione
D'Escompte,42 Bristol v. Washington Co.,43 Liverpool and
London and Globe Insurance Co. v. Board of Assessors,44 and
the mass of state decisions which have allowed direct property
taxes under similar circumstances. 45
Apparently, then, the majority of the Court had no intention
of throwing discredit upon either of these well established
35 Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Louisville, supra, note 25.
36Blodget v. Silbernan, supra, note 34.
37 Callahan v. Woodbridge, 171 Mass. 595, 51 N. E. 176; Matter of
Morgan, 150 N. Y. 35, 44 N. E. 1126; Wheeler v. Sohmer, 233 U. S. 434,
58 L. Ed. 1030; In re Estate of Adams, 167 Iowa 382, 149 N. E. 531.
38 233 U. S. 434, 58 L. Ed. 1030.
39 See Cases collected in Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, p. 109, notes 55,
56, 57.
40 196 U. S. 611, 48 L. Ed. 619.
41 175 U. S. 309, 44 L. Ed. 174.
42 191 U. S. 388, 48 L. Ed. 701.
43 177 U. S. 133, 44 L. Ed. 701.
44 221 U. S. 346, 55 L. Ed. 762.
45 See cases collected in Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, pp. 87-92 and notes
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doctrines. Just how they propose to right the 'injustice" and
"oppressive" results is just a little bit difficult to guess. About
the only safe conclusion is that the Court took occasion to em-
ploy some very fine but broad language in a case of only
moderate significance. The law, however, seems perfectly clear
and the case is significant for exactly what it decides, and no
more. While this reduces the possibility of multiple taxation
of inheritances, it in no sense restricts such taxation to one
state, nor does it give reasonalile promise for any further
restriction in the future. As to promising any modification
in the general application of mobilia sequuntur personam, the
obiter in this case tends more than anything else to neutralize
the uncalled for excesses of the opinion in the Safe Deposit etc.
v. Virginia. About the only net result of the two cases is that
the lawyer had best take the decisions for what they actually
decide and put no faith in dicta.
Nor is such a result undesirable. In spite of the continued
and persistent pressure brought to bear upon the Court and
in spite of the criticism from high sources and competent
scholars, 46 it is submitted that the practice of the states should
not be disturbed. In spite of the fact that, as Mr. Justice
McReynolds insists, "primitive conditions have passed" it is
very doubtful if man's primitive impulse to avoid paying taxes
has passed. Until the owners of intangible wealth demonstrate
some more inclination to pay one tax fairly imposed than they
have in the past, the occasional injustice in a particular case
must yield to the expediency of laws which are designed to pre-
vent the entire escape of property which is all too easy to con-
ceal from the assessor.
40 See e. g. Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, p. 89.
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